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Abstract
Lighting accounts for nearly 20% of overall U.S. electricity consumption and 18% of U.S.
residential electricity consumption. A transition to alternative energy-efficient technologies could
reduce this energy consumption considerably. To quantify the influence of factors that drive
consumer choices for light bulbs, we conducted a choice-based conjoint field experiment with
183 participants. We estimated discrete choice models from the data, and found that politically
liberal consumers have a stronger preference for compact fluorescent lighting technology and for
low energy consumption. Greater willingness to pay for lower energy consumption and longer
life was observed in conditions where estimated operating cost information was provided.
Providing estimated annual cost information to consumers reduced their implicit discount rate by
a factor of five, lowering barriers to adoption of energy efficient alternatives with higher up-front
costs; however, even with cost information provided, consumers continued to use implicit
discount rates of around 100%, which is larger than that experienced for other energy
technologies.
Keywords
energy efficient lighting; implicit discount rate; consumer preference; choice experiment;
discrete choice analysis; conjoint analysis
11. Introduction
In 2008, residential compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) socket saturation1 was 10% nationwide
(D&R International, 2009), with the remainder being almost entirely incandescent bulbs. About
half of the total lighting service (in terms of lumens) was provided by incandescent bulbs, and a
little over 20% was provided by CFL bulbs (Navigant Consulting, 2010), suggesting that further
adoption of CFLs – or other efficient lighting technologies, such as light emitting diodes – could
achieve considerable energy savings in the residential sector. In many cases, these efficient
alternatives would also save money for households. The slow transition to CFLs does not seem
to be due to poor public awareness, since about 70% of Americans know about CFLs (Sylvania,
2010). These data suggest that there may be other barriers that keep consumers from adopting
CFLs.
Engineering economic analyses have long suggested that there is a gap between current
residential energy consumption and optimal levels that could be achieved if the most energy-
efficient and cost-effective end-use technologies providing the same level of energy services
were adopted instead (Hirst and Brown, 1990; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). There have been
numerous studies analyzing potential reasons that prevent optimal efficiency from being
achieved (Anderson and Claxton, 1982; Golove and Eto, 1996; Brown, 2001), including low
price of energy caused by distortional regulation, misplaced incentives between tenants and
landlords (also known as the principal-agent problem), lack of access to financing options
1 Socket saturation is frequently used as a measure of market penetration of a specific type of light bulb. It is defined
as a percentage of total number of bulb sockets that contain a specific type of light bulb.
2(Blumstein et al., 1980), uncertainty in the future price of electricity or other fuels, low priority
of energy issues for consumers among other types of expenditures (Brown, 2001), consumers’
limited cognitive capacity (Anderson and Claxton, 1982), and the fact that energy efficiency
often is inseparable from other unwanted features in products (Golove and Eto, 1996). A recent
report from the National Academy of Sciences on “America’s Energy Future” (2009) states that
well-designed policies such as building energy codes, Energy Star product labeling, and
efficiency standards could help overcome these barriers and that these policy initiatives already
achieve primary energy savings of about 13 quadrillion BTU per year.
Researchers have taken various approaches to measure the relative priority consumers place on
energy efficiency versus upfront cost when making technology purchases, including implicit
discount rates (IDRs) (Gately, 1980; Meier and Whittier, 1983). The IDR, or hurdle rate, is the
value of the discount rate for a hypothetical net-present-value-maximizing consumer that best
matches observed choice behavior. When viewed from the framing of classical economic
discounting, consumers appear to behave as though they are using the implicit discount rate to
value current vs. future costs (with some error).
The IDRs are used as inputs in many energy-economy models to explain how the share of end-
use energy technologies evolves over time. For example, the Energy Information Agency’s (EIA)
National Energy Modeling Systems (NEMS), assumes hurdle rates for consumer appliances that
range from 15% (gas furnace) to 90% (electric clothes dryer) depending on the residential end-
uses considered (U.S. EIA, 2011). There are debates on the usefulness and appropriate ranges of
such estimates of IDRs as a means of describing consumer choices and behavior (Frederick et al.,
32002). Attributing consumers’ choices solely to their discount rates can lead to misunderstanding
consumer behavior, since other factors such as the effect of marketing and advertising, lack of
knowledge, or imperfect substitutability across two competing technologies also play a role in
choices (Mulder, 2005). However, in terms of energy system modeling, using high discount rates
to explain technology choices by consumers is still the standard approach.
To improve understanding of barriers to adoption of energy-efficient lighting, we perform
choice-based conjoint experiments and assess the following:
1. We measure consumer preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for general
illumination, and we identify barriers to the adoption of efficient lighting technologies.
Specifically, we quantify the importance of product attributes (price, wattage, brightness,
lifetime, and technology type) and consumer characteristics (income, education, housing
characteristics, political views, perception of climate change, and perception of toxicity
issues) in determining bulb choice. Using WTP allows us to directly compare preferences
for distinct attributes that have different units.
2. We estimate IDRs for lighting technologies.
3. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) implemented a new label that includes
estimated operation cost information and is required on lamp packages starting in 2012.
We measure the effect of labeling estimated bulb operation cost on resulting choices,
WTP, and IDRs.
4In the next section, we summarize the literature on IDRs and discrete choice analysis. Based on
this understanding, the method and the results of our experiment will be explained in Section 3
and 4 respectively, and in Section 5 we conclude.
2. Previous work on eliciting implicit discount rates for energy-saving
household appliances
Research on consumers’ IDRs started in the 1980s using two general methods: 1) asking
participants hypothetical questions about the future savings they would require before making
investments in energy efficiency (see, for example, Houston 1983), and more commonly, 2)
building econometric models of consumer utility or other quantities and comparing coefficients
for price and/or annual operating cost variables. The second method can implicitly derive
discount rates without forcing participants to answer speculative questions like the first method
does. We use a variant of this second method with a nonlinear model specification explained in
the next section.
Table 1 provides a summary of several studies that elicited IDR for end-use energy technologies
over time. We provide more detail regarding the study from Hausman (1979), who constructed
an individual choice model for air conditioners (AC), as it has the closest formulation to our
model. In this model, each individual chooses a specific AC that maximizes his or her utility
function. The utility function posed is:
5௝ܷ = െߚଵ ή ܱܥ݋ݏݐ௝ െ ߚଶ ή ܲݎ݅ܿ ௝݁ െ ߚଷ ή ܦ݅ݏܿ݋݂݉݋ݎݐ௝ + ߝ௝ (1)
Where Uj is the utility gained by selecting product j, ܱܥ݋ݏݐ௝ is the annual electricity cost ($/yr)
due to AC use, ܲݎ݅ܿ ௝݁ is the initial purchase cost ($), ܦ݅ݏܿ݋݂݉݋ݎݐ௝ is the discomfort level that
increases as the temperature setting for the AC increases, and ߝ௝ is the error term. From purchase
records and capacity/efficiency information of ACs in the market, Hausman estimated the
coefficients in the utility function using maximum likelihood estimation. The author assumes
that the utility depends on annualized capital cost, so that ߚଶ is an annualizing factor. Then, the
implicit discount rate r can be computed using the capital recovery factor for a given AC lifetime
q:
ߚመଶ = ߚመଵ ݎ(1 + ݎ)௤(1 + ݎ)௤ െ 1 (2)
The resulting IDRs in the study ranged from 5% to 89% depending on household income level.
Frederick et al. (2002) emphasize that the intertemporal choices, such as investments in energy-
efficiency, are not only influenced by time preferences—what they define as “the preference for
immediate utility over delayed utility”—which we measure with IDRs. Rather, they are
determined jointly by various confounding factors such as intertemporal arbitrage (e.g. imperfect
capital markets), uncertainty (i.e. uncertain about whether future energy savings will be
achieved), and expectations of changing utility functions (e.g. expecting increased future income
6or wealth). Azevedo et al. (2009) and Jaffe and Stavins (1994) also argued that IDRs include
factors such as lack of technical or financial knowledge, the role of marketing or advertising, or
habit formation. Despite this caveat, our estimation of IDRs for the lighting sector will contribute
to a better understanding of the energy efficiency gap regarding the adoption of energy-efficient
lighting.
3. Methods
3.1. Experimental Method
We observe choices made by participants in an experiment and construct an econometric model
of consumer utility as explained later in Section 3.2. In preparation for this study, we conducted
preparatory pilots and interviews and found the five most important bulb characteristics for
consumers were price, energy use, color, lifetime, and brightness. Some participants also
mentioned bulb startup time, headaches, and dimming as potential impeding factors for CFLs.
Although there is no scientific evidence that CFLs cause headaches (U.S. FDA, 2012), we
included health questions in our questionnaire because these reported subjective perceptions can
also influence choices.
The field experiment consisted of three main parts: 1) a conjoint choice experiment, 2) choices of
real light bulbs, and 3) questions on demographics, experience, knowledge, and attitudes. To
observe the effect of disclosing annual cost information, subjects were randomly assigned to
either one of two groups. Half of the participants were shown annual operating cost information
7in their choice tasks while the other half were not. From this point, the group provided with the
information is referred to as the with-cost group and the group without it as the without-cost
group.
Experiment setup: We designed a controlled experiment with a choice based conjoint survey.
The stated choices are then used to estimate several random utility discrete choice models. The
experiment was performed in a mobile laboratory2, using laptops set up with choice tasks (using
Sawtooth software) and a survey.3 We asked a total of 39 questions (15 choice tasks + 24
additional questions). Each choice task presented three alternatives among which a participant
chooses one, as shown in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 approximately here]
The attribute levels were selected to cover the ranges commonly available in the market, and
product profiles were selected from the full factorial of 2×35 potential permutations. For each
subject, 36 alternatives (12 tasks/subject × 3 alternatives/task) were generated using Sawtooth’s
complete enumeration strategy, which seeks to achieve balance and orthogonality for main
effects and first order interactions while minimizing overlap among attribute levels within each
choice task (Kuhfeld, 1997). Many of the profiles represent combinations of attributes that do not
2 The Center for Behavioral and Decision Research (http://www.cbdr.cmu.edu/datatruck/index.html)
3 Sawtooth is a software commonly used for marketing studies and conjoint analyses.
(http://www.sawtoothsoftware.com/)
8appear together for products in today’s market (e.g.: 75W CFL with a 1,000 hour lifetime), but
all represent plausible and understandable alternatives, and the enumeration allows elimination
of sources of bias like multi-collinearity.
Three fixed choice tasks were identical for all participants. The role of the first two fixed tasks
was intended to check whether participants are paying attention to the experiment. In the first
fixed task, the alternatives are identical except that one has a longer life than the others. In the
second one, one alternative had the lowest price and the longest life. Fifteen subjects out of 183
who did not choose the dominant alternatives in these two tasks were considered as not attentive
and removed from our analysis.
The third fixed task was used to determine the compensation to participants (hereinafter referred
to as “compensation task”). Jointly with the consent form, participants were given an instruction
page where it was stated: “Your choice from one specific question, placed randomly among the
fifteen choice questions you will answer, determines the compensation you will receive at the end
of the experiment.” Thus, one among the three types of real light bulbs was handed out to
participants at the end of the experiment depending on their choices from the compensation task.
Participants were informed beforehand that they would be compensated with a type of light bulb
decided based on their choices, but they were not told which specific task determined the
compensation. Ding et al. (2005) tested adding an incentive among the conjoint choice tasks and
observed that this method helps participants to make choices that are closer to their true
preference, reducing the limitation of observing stated preferences that differ from market
behavior, although the compensation may have also incentivized people who might otherwise
9have chosen lower priced bulbs to choose the expensive bulbs, which would lead to somewhat
deflated price coefficients.
Physical choice task: once the computer-based choice tasks were finalized, participants were
asked to follow the experimenter to another room, where they were asked to choose among five
pairs of real light bulbs in their original packaging. Price information was provided on a tag next
to each lamp package. These choices were not used as compensation to participants; these
choices were simply used to compare physical light bulb choices with the predictions from our
model to assess external validity.
Demographics, experience, knowledge, and attitudes: After the choice tasks, each participant
was asked to fill out a survey with questions on demographics, prior experience with lamps,
environmental attitudes, political views, basic understanding of bulb characteristics, perception
of climate change, and perception of toxicity issues.
3.2. Analytical Model
Consumer utility model: We estimate a mixed logit model, which models heterogeneity of
consumer preferences via random coefficients and mitigates the restrictive substitution patterns
(i.e. independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)) of a multinomial logit (MNL) model and
improves fit.4 Logit estimates using categorical variables for all attributes (discrete conjoint
levels) suggest linear or quadratic utility functions for numerical explanatory variables (price,
4 A likelihood ratio test between a MNL model and our basic mixed logit model gives Ȥ2(8)=457.1 and p<0.000
(Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 3).
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brightness, power, and lifetime), and we use these throughout. 5 The utility ௜ܷ௝ that consumer i
draws from product alternative j is modeled as:
௜ܷ௝ = ௜ܸ௝ + ߳௜௝ = ෍൭ߚ௞ ή ݔ௝௞ + ෍ߛ௞௡ ή ݖ௜௡ ή ݔ௝௞ே௡ୀଵ ൱௄௞ୀଵ + ߳௜௝, (3)
where ߚ௞ is the preference coefficient for attribute k,ݔ௝௞ is the k-th attribute of alternative j, ߛ௞௡
is the coefficient for interactions between consumer attribute n and product attribute k, ݖ௜௡ is the
n-th attribute of consumer i, and ߳௜௝ is the random error term, taken as an iid standard Gumbel
distribution (Train, 2003). The interaction terms ݖ௜௡ ή ݔ௝௞ reveal how individual characteristics
can affect preference for bulb attributes. We assume continuous numerical bulb attributes unless
otherwise noted, as shown in Table 2. For the mixed logit model, both ߚ௞ and ߛ௞௡ are random
variables, assumed to be normally or log-normally distributed with distributional parameters
estimated via likelihood maximization.
[Table 2 approximately here]
Specifically, our base model (Model 2 in Table 3), which excludes respondent covariates ݖ௜௡, is:
5 Additional results for alternative model specifications are available from the authors upon request.
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௜ܷ௝ = ൫ߚҧଵ + ߪଵߥଵ௜൯ݔ௝୘ଢ଼୔୉ െ exp൫ߚҧଶ + ߪଶߥଶ௜൯ݔ௝୔ୖ୍େ୉ + exp൫ߚҧଷ + ߪଷߥଷ௜൯ݔ௝୐୍୊୉
+ ൫ߚҧସ + ߪସߥସ௜൯ݔ௝୆ୖ୍ୋୌ୘ + ൫ߚҧହ + ߪହߥହ௜൯൫ݔ௝୆ୖ୍ୋୌ୘൯ଶ + ൫ߚҧ଺ + ߪ଺ߥ଺௜൯ݔ௝୛୅୘୘
+෍ ൫ߚҧ଻௠ + ߪ଻௠ߥ଻௠௜൯ݔ௠௝େ୓୐୓ୖଶ௠ୀଵ
+ ܦ௜୓୔େ୓ୗ୘ ൬ߚҧଵେݔ௝୘ଢ଼୔୉ + ߚҧଶେݔ௝୔ୖ୍େ୉ + ߚҧଷେݔ௝୐୍୊୉ + ߚҧସେݔ௝୆ୖ୍ୋୌ୘ + ߚҧହେ൫ݔ௜௝୆ୖ୍ୋୌ୘൯ଶ
+ ߚҧ଺େݔ௝୛୅୘୘ +෍ ߚҧ଻௠େ ݔ௠௝େ୓୐୓ୖଶ௠ୀଵ ൰+߳௜௝
(4)
where m indexes the discrete levels of the color attribute, ߚҧ and ߪ are the distributional
parameters for the random coefficients, ߥ is a random variable with an iid standard normal
distribution. We assume that preference for type, brightness, and wattage varies normally in the
population and preference for price and life varies log-normally, since a change in sign for
preference of price or life would be counterintuitive and theoretically problematic. For
interaction terms, we use fixed coefficients for ease of interpretation. In our final model (Model
3 in Table 3), we test the interaction between lifetime and income levels, which was the only
significant interaction term in several variants of the model we tested. Other interactions between
bulb types and perception/attitude variables are included to understand whether consumers
would differ in their choices for incandescent or fluorescent technologies as a result of their
perceptions or attitudes towards climate change, toxicity associated with certain lighting
technologies, participants’ awareness of the relationships between bulb characteristics, and
participants’ political orientation.
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Model for estimation of implicit discount rates: To estimate IDRs, many conventional studies
including Hausman’s (1979) assumed a single exogenous value of average lifetime. This
assumption was inappropriate in our case considering our use of lifetime as an independent
variable determining consumer utility and also the vast difference between a lifetime of a CFL
and that of an incandescent bulb in the market. Instead, we estimated the IDR explicitly in the
estimation procedure using annualized cost:
(annualized capital cost) =
ݎ(1 + ݎ)௫ై౅ూు
(1 + ݎ)௫ై౅ూు െ 1 ή ݔ୔ୖ୍େ୉. (5)
Here, ݔ୐୍୊୉ is expressed in years.6 The base model specification for estimating IDR is
௜ܷ௝ = െ݁ݔ݌(ߚ଴ + ߪ଴ߥ଴௜)൭ ߚଵ(1 + ߚଵ)௫೔ೕై౅ూు
(1 + ߚଵ)௫೔ೕై౅ూు െ 1 ݔ௜௝୔ୖ୍େ୉ + ݔ௜௝୓୔େ୓ୗ୘൱+ (ߚଶ + ߪଶߥଶ௜)ݔ௜௝୘ଢ଼୔୉
+(ߚଷ + ߪଷߥଷ௜)ݔ௜௝୆ୖ୍ୋୌ୘ + (ߚସ + ߪସߥସ௜)൫ݔ௜௝୆ୖ୍ୋୌ୘൯ଶ
+෍ (ߚହ௠ + ߪହ௠ߥହ௠௜)ݔ௠௜௝େ୓୐୓ୖଶ௠ୀଵ + ߳௜௝ ,
(6)
where ȕ0 represents average consumer sensitivity to annualized cost of ownership and ȕ1
represents the consumer’s IDR. Other ȕs can be interpreted in the same way as in Equation (4).7,8
6We assume that consumers accept the lifetime information written on packages as true, i.e. they do not anticipate
an early failure or a defective bulb.
7 Because the IDR model is nonlinear in parameters, the log-likelihood function may have multiple local maxima.
We seek global maxima via randomized multistart.
8 Wattage is perfectly correlated with operating cost, so their effects cannot be determined independently. By
removing wattage from the utility function, we treat consumer preference for low wattage as though it is entirely
preference for low operating cost. If consumers also prefer low wattage for other reasons (e.g.: environmental), then
13
Because the conjoint task is randomized, the estimate of IDR should be independent of the
presence of other attributes in the model. Through maximum likelihood estimation, we can
estimate the population’s average IDR (i.e. ߚመଵ) employed when making purchasing decisions for
any lighting products.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Summary statistics and sample characterization
Fifteen among the 183 subjects were removed from the analysis as explained in Section 3.1, and
the remaining 168 subjects were used for this analysis.
Figure 2 shows age and income distribution of the participant group in this study, juxtaposed
with country-, city- (Pittsburgh), state-level (Pennsylvania) statistics retrieved from the 2010 U.S.
Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Since the neighborhood where the study was performed has
a large student population, the age group under 34 and the income group under $10k appear
over-represented. Median tiers for income, education, and age were $30-50k per year, bachelor’s
degree, and age group 25-34. 56% of participants were male, 41% owned their houses, and 17%
have children.
we may be overestimating preference for low operating cost. Thus, our estimates of implicit discount rate may be
biased downward.
14
[Figure 2 approximately here]
Ratings on seriousness of climate change were observed to be correlated with political view, but
not with education or income: Liberal participants believed that climate change is a more serious
issue than participants with different political views.
We also asked participants to rank the ten major technical factors that would affect their choice
for light bulbs. When rankings of these factors were averaged numerically (a rough assessment),
both with- and without-cost groups showed the same decreasing order: Brightness ظ Price ظ
Lifetime ظ Energy Cost ظ Color ظ Wattage ظ Type ظ Wattage Equivalent ظ Time to Full
Brightness ظ Shape.
4.2. Main Results
Table 3 shows our main results. Models 1 and 2 show the results for a model that does not
include consumer specific attributes, while Model 3 in the second column includes consumer
attributes.
[Table 3 approximately here]
We also compute mean willingness to pay (WTP) derived from draws based on the parameter
vector of the model and the variance covariance matrix from the estimation process
incorporating the sampling variance (Hensher and Greene, 2003). We do not report all WTP
15
results due to space limitations, but we discuss key findings, and additional information is
available from the authors upon request.
WTP for a unit increase in variable X can be calculated taking ratios between ȕX and ȕPRICE.
However in our case, since many ȕX values and ȕPRICE are assumed to be random, we cannot
simply divide one with the other. Instead, we use a Monte Carlo analysis, where we draw mean
beta values from their joint distributions incorporating sampling variances and calculate the
ratios for each draw. The mean of the ratios yields the population mean WTP of attribute X9.
4.3. Analysis
4.3.1 How do bulb-specific factors affect consumer choices?
From Model 2, we observed that, all else being equal, consumers generally prefer CFL
technology and a relatively high level of brightness. Preferences for color and wattage are
diverse: the standard deviations in the population are significant while the means are not,
implying that some consumers prefer warmer color and lower wattage while others prefer the
opposite. Preferences for low power (p<0.01) and long life (p<0.1) increase when operation cost
information is provided.
9
I.e., given an estimated vector of beta from our model is B (K×1) and the estimated variance-covariance matrix is
V (K×K), we take N draws from MVN(B, V) (multivariate normal) distribution, which results in a matrix, D (N×K).
For each draw i (i=1, 2, …, N), we keep b௜ଡ଼ = ߚ௜ଡ଼LIȕ;LVDVVXPHGQRUPDORUFRQYHUWLWWRb௜ଡ଼ = ݁ݔ݌(ߚ௜ଡ଼ + ݏ݀௜ଡ଼ଶ 2Τ )
LI ȕ; LV DVVXPHG ORJQRUPDO :H FDOFXODWHܧ ቂb௜ଡ଼ ݁ݔ݌(ߚ௜୔ୖ୍େ୉ + ݏ݀௜୔ୖ୍େ୉ଶ 2Τ )Τ ቃ over the N draws and use it as a
mean WTP for attribute X.
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Participants are willing to pay $2.63 more for CFL bulbs than for incandescent bulbs on average,
all else being equal; however, there was considerable variance, with some consumers willing to
pay more for incandescent bulbs. Consumers are willing to pay $0.52 more for every 1,000 hours
of lifetime increase within the range tested in the experiment (1,000 ~ 12,000 hours), and that
amount increased by $0.14 when they were shown annual cost estimates. They are willing to
pay $0.46 more for every 10W decrease within the range of 9~75W when the annual cost
information is shown.
4.3.2. How do consumer-specific factors affect consumer choices?
At the p<0.05 level, liberals have a stronger preference for low wattage bulbs than non-liberals.
At the p<0.1 level, high income consumers have a stronger preference for long life than low
income consumers, liberals have a stronger preference for CFLs than non-liberals, and people
who correctly answer CFLs contain toxic materials and rate toxicity as “very dangerous” have a
stronger preference for incandescent bulbs over CFLs than people who incorrectly answer or rate
it as “not at all dangerous”. Gromet et al. (2013) supports the finding that political ideology
affects one’s tendency to invest in energy efficient technology. Between Model 2 and 3 in Table
3, the significance of most coefficients for main technical features of bulbs did not change. The
only change was that the mean coefficient of type variable becomes statistically insignificant
suggesting that mean preference for this attribute is mainly induced by different levels of toxicity
or political view, while the standard deviation remains significant meaning that the distribution
itself is still significantly different from zero.
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The relevance of various personal attitude variables in consumer decision making has been
emphasized in multiple discrete choice studies, especially in the transportation sector (Ewing and
Sarigöllü, 2000; Choo and Mokhtarian, 2004; Vredin Johansson et al., 2006; Domarchi et al.,
2008). For example, Ewing and Sarigöllü (2000) investigated the effect of personal attitudes
toward environment and technology on preferences for alternative fuel vehicles through a choice
experiment. They found that while the attitudinal factors were significant, the increase in log-
likelihood of the model due to the factors was not large. Teisl et al. (2008) suggested that
consumers’ perception or subjective concern for environmental problems together with eco-label
information affected consumers’ ‘eco-behavior’ such as purchasing greener vehicles. We
observed that the findings from these studies applied similarly to lighting purchase decisions as
well.
4.3.3. What is the right level of model complexity for policy analysis and for energy models?
Table 3 presents the three models we test for this analysis. Among them, the MNL model (Model
1) is the simplest and the easiest to understand, but it has the highest AIC/BIC values compared
to the other two models. A likelihood ratio test between Model 1 and 2 gives Ȥ2(8)=457.1 and
p<0.001, while a similar test between Model 2 and 3 gives Ȥ2(18)=30.8 and p=0.03. Considering
the relativity of statistical significance (depending on the significance level decision), the
AIC/BIC results, and also the understandability of the model, we suggest that Model 2 addresses
choice complexity and has the benefit of modeling consumer heterogeneity and avoiding the
restrictive substitution patterns (i.e. IIA).
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4.3.4. How does disclosing annual operating cost information impact choices?
Model 2 and 3 show that having operating cost information is related to preferences for longer
lifetime and lower wattage with no significant influence on choices for color, brightness, type,
and price. According to the values in Model 2, and holding all other attributes constant, when the
operating cost information was given a consumer was willing to pay $0.14 more for a 1,000-hour
increase of lifetime and $0.46 more for a 10W decrease of power compared to the case where
s/he did not see the information. A potential explanation for this is that when the annual
operating cost information is given, consumers tend to pay more attention to the implications of
lifetime and power on future savings10 The fact that lower power and longer lifetime affect
consumer choices less when operating cost information is not shown is a potential reason why
CFLs have underperformed in the market prior to introduction of packaging labels that
incorporate operating cost estimates.
4.3.5. What are the implicit discount rates (IDR) that consumers use when making choices for
lighting technologies?
We fit a nonlinear model as shown in Equation (6) above including just the bulb attributes and
the indicator of operating cost availability. We fit it separately for with- and without-cost groups
and for three different income brackets (low/middle/high) to see the relationship between income
and IDR. The discount rate estimates from this model are presented in Table 4. We found that
average IDR is 100% for the with-cost group (i.e. with operation costs information) and 560%
10When operating cost information is presented, respondents also have more information to process. However, this
information appears to affect only preferences for power and lifetime without significantly affecting other attributes.
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for the without-cost group (i.e. without operation costs information), and IDR decreases as
income increases. Among the with-cost group, the IDR of the low income group was about five
times larger than that of higher income consumers. However, in the without-cost group, the
standard error of the low-income group was so large that we could not clearly say the low
income group’s IDR is higher than others. The high income group’s IDR was significantly
smaller than the mid-income group’s value. Thus the higher up-front cost and delayed benefits of
CFLs relative to incandescent bulbs is particularly pronounced for low to medium income groups
and less of an issue for high-income groups.
[Table 4 approximately here]
In the experimental setting, the without-cost group was not provided with operating cost
information, but with just the wattage of the bulb and the number of hours of operation. We
assumed in Equation (6) that consumers’ utility is represented by the annualized cost of
ownership, such that the participants are inferring annualized operating cost from usage and
power information during the choice process. The estimated IDRs in Table 5 4 suggest that
consumers are pessimistic about (or pay little attention to) future economic savings delivered
from the energy efficient alternatives. It is possible that respondents who were not shown
estimated cost information made different assumptions about energy prices or frequency of bulb
use than the assumptions used to compute estimated annual operating cost information for the
label, and it is not known which estimates are more accurate for individual consumers.
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All of these estimated discount rates are on the high side in the ranges of discount rate values
used in the NEMS (U.S. EIA, 2011). Savings from individual energy efficient light bulbs are
normally smaller than savings from other energy efficient appliances, which may contribute to
consumers choosing to use higher IDRs. This behavior was reported by Green et al. (1997). This
finding suggests that lighting can face a higher barrier than other technologies with regard to the
perception of operating cost information and potential reductions in energy bills. It also implies
that while disclosing operating cost information as in the new FTC label will contribute
significantly to further adoption of efficient light bulbs, it alone is not likely to be sufficient, and
other policies with minimum efficiency standards (e.g. Section 321 of The Energy Independence
and Security Act (EISA)) will be needed to achieve more savings.
4.3.6. Model validation through physical choice observations
To examine the predictive accuracy of the estimated model, we first calculated population-wide
choice probabilities of the three alternatives that were shown in the compensation task. These
probabilities were computed using a variant of Model 2, which was estimated excluding the
choices made by participants in the compensation task. Choice probabilities for each alternative
were averaged over the distributions of the random coefficients to yield these probabilities.11 In
Table 5, we display the frequency of chosen alternatives in the compensation task and the
population-wide choice probabilities predicted from the model respectively for all subjects,
without-cost, and with-cost group.
11 Numerical integration was used with 1000 draws from the random coefficients.
21
[Table 5 approximately here]
Concurrent to this, we used our model to predict choice probabilities for the five physical
samples presented in the second part of our experiment to test how our model predicts physical
bulb choices. Physical choices and predicted choice probabilities are presented in Table 6.
[Table 6 approximately here]
In Table 7 we compare the results from estimates of choices using Model 2 with the choices
made by participants in the compensation task, and with the choices made in the physical choice
task. We further compare each of these with what the choices would be if one uses simply a
random model that treats all choice alternatives as equally likely.
[Table 7 approximately here]
We use several metrics to compare across the choice probabilities estimated by our model,
choices in the compensation task, choices in the task where participants were exposed to physical
light bulbs, and the random model:
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x The log likelihood: Log of the product of predicted probabilities for all observed choices.
It indicates the goodness of the model fit.
x The equivalent average likelihood (EAL): The geometric mean of likelihood per choice
made. It can be interpreted as the likelihood normalized to the size of the data. This
metric was referred to as average hit rate by Feit et al. (2010), although it is more closely
related to likelihood than hit rate.
x The average hit rate (AHR): The average probability that a draw from the model would
match the choice observed for a randomly selected individual.
x The average share prediction error: The average value of the differences between
predicted share and actual share.
Not too surprisingly, our model is better than a random model, offering a basic validity check.
The improvement in EAL and AHR over the random model appears relatively small. However,
these comparisons should be viewed with understanding that random utility choice models are
not intended to predict every individual's choices separately, since individual choices themselves
are stochastic. Rather, these models are intended to model aggregate behavior when integrated
over the population, and the average share error of the model, an aggregate measure, is
substantially better than random.
Our model predicts the choices for the compensation task with an average of 4.2% error,
compared to 10.4% error for a random model. In the physical choice task, which involves
unobserved technology attributes such as packaging, brand, etc. that were not present in the
conjoint study, the model predicts share with an average of 5.7% error, compared to 9.6% error
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for a random model. These metrics suggest that attributes such as brand, packaging, shape, or
size may play significant roles in choices, which we are not capturing in the model we estimated.
[Table 7 approximately here]
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
We examine reasons for limited adoption of compact fluorescent bulbs using a choice-based
conjoint experiment to quantify the effect of product and consumer attributes on consumer
choice in conditions where annual operating cost estimates are disclosed vs. withheld. A caveat
is that the subjects collected in this experiment over-represent young low income consumers.
Our results suggest that consumer choices are significantly affected by most bulb characteristics
tested, including color, brightness, lifetime, power, type, and price. Perceived danger of toxicity
in CFLs and political view are the consumer-specific factors that have significant influence on
preferences for bulb attributes. Perceived severity of climate change or basic technical
knowledge in lighting did not significantly affect preferences. This result suggests that
educational efforts such as communicating the low risk of mercury in CFLs can be effective in
driving CFL adoption, while linking CFL use and climate change mitigation is less to be helpful.
However, our results suggest that these consumer-specific characteristics are not as significant in
predicting consumer choices as bulb characteristics.
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We find that providing operating cost information induces stronger preferences for bulbs with
longer lifetime and lower energy consumption. Implicit discount rates (IDRs) decreased from
over 560% to around 100% when respondents were provided annual operating cost estimates.
The IDRs were observed to decrease as household income increases. This suggests that
consumers weigh future savings more strongly when the information is given. The combination
of these two findings put the new FTC labeling rule on a strong footing. The relationship
between IDR and income suggests that higher-income consumers are more likely to adopt CFLs,
and the high IDRs used by middle and lower income consumers presents a particularly large
barrier to adoption.
Even when cost information is available, the estimated IDR for individual lamp choices of
around 100% is still larger than most values used for other technology types in the NEMS model.
Our findings can be meaningfully used to update such models. Future studies can examine why
the discount rates are so high for lighting and whether alternative models such as hyperbolic
discounting or models that account for satisficing behavior can explain consumer choices better
than traditional economic discounting.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Example of a choice task seen by participants. The attribute values in the table change
in each choice task following our randomized design. Each subject answered 15 tasks similar to
this one on a laptop. The annual operating cost in parentheses in the third row of the table was
shown only to half of the participants.
Figure 2. Distributions of age and income (N=168). City and state data are from the 2010 U.S.
Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).
Highlights
x Light bulb choice models are estimated through a choice-based conjoint experiment.
x Implicit discount rates drop fivefold when operating cost information is provided.
x Bulb features and cost drive choice more than consumer demographics or awareness.
x Toxicity awareness and political leanings also affect bulb preferences.
1Tables
Table 1. Selective reviews of studies on implicit discount rate implied by purchases of energy efficient goods
Study Product Data source Year of data
retrieval
Range of estimated
discount rate
Method
Hausman
(1979)
Room AC 46 samples from an MRI
energy consumption survey and
AHAM product directory
1978 5.1% ~ 89% (with
income effect
added)
Econometric
model (Discrete
choice analysis)
Gately
(1980)
17 cu-ft.
refrigerator
Price data of models from three
major manufacturers
Jan 1978 45% ~ 300% Unspecified
Houston
(1983)
Hypothetical
device
Mail survey (1081 samples
from Indiana)
1979 10% ~ 50% (given
as choices in the
survey): with mean
of 22.5%
Direct inquiry
Meier and
Whittier
(1983)
17 cu-ft.
refrigerator
Price data from a nationwide
retailer
1977 - 1979 1% ~ 102% Price and energy
use comparison
Dreyfus
and Viscusi
(1995)
Automobile Residential Transportation
Energy Consumption Survey
by DOE (1775 observations)
1988 11% ~ 17% Econometric
model (Nonlinear
least square)
Ruderman
et al. (1987)
Heating and
cooling
equipment,
refrigerator
Appliance purchase cost and
efficiency data from DOE and
other reports, and historical
shipping data from DOE
1972 - 1980 18% ~ 825% Lifecycle cost
minimization
Doane and
Harman
(1984)
Thermal shell,
window and
door, water
heating, space
heating
Customer energy use survey by
an utility (GPU, now
FirstEnergy) (882 households),
cost and savings estimates from
Lawrence Berkeley Natl lab
1982 0% ~ 400% Econometric
model (Discrete
choice analysis)
Mau et al.
(2003)
Hybrid electric
car and
hydrogen fuel
cell vehicles
Mail survey (916 for HEV,
1019 for HFCV)
2002 21% ~ 49% Controlled
experiment
(Discrete choice
analysis)
This study Light bulbs Choice-based conjoint
experiment with 183
participants
2011 Explained below Controlled
experiment
(Discrete choice
analysis)
2Table 2. Descriptions of variables.
Variable Description Valueݔ௜௝୘ଢ଼୔୉ Dummy indicating bulb type 0: incandescent, 1: CFLݔ௜௝୔ୖ୍େ୉ Price of the bulb j in subject i’s choice task $0.49 / $2.49 / $4.49ݔ௠௜௝େ୓୐୓ୖ Dummy for color, where ݔଵ௜௝௖௢௟௢௥ is bright white andݔଶ௜௝௖௢௟௢௥ is daylight 0: No, 1: Yesݔ௜௝୐୍୊୉ Lifetime of the bulb j in subject i’s choice task 1,000/8,000/12,000
[hours]ݔ௜௝୆ୖ୍ୋୌ୘ Brightness level of the bulb j in subject i’s choice task 500/1,200/1,800
[lumens]ݔ௜௝୛୅୘୘ Power consumption of the bulb j in subject i’s choice
task
9/25/75 [watt]ܦ௜୓୔େ୓ୗ୘ Dummy indicating whether annual operating cost
information is provided to subject i
0: No, 1: Yesݖ௜୉ଡ଼୔୉ୖ୍୉୒େ୉ Dummy indicating whether subject i has used CFLs
before
0: No, 1: Yesݖ௜୆୙ଢ଼୆୙୐୆ Dummy indicating whether subject i buys light bulbs
sometimes
0: No, 1: Yesݖ௜ୌ୉୅୐୘ୌ Dummy indicating whether subject i has experienced any
health issues related to CFL use
0: No, 1: Yesݖ௜୆୅େୌ୉୐୓ୖ Dummy indicating whether subject i has a bachelor’s
degree
0: No, 1: Yesݖ௜୑୍ୈ୍୒େݖ௜ୌ୍୍୒େ Dummy indicating subject i's annual household income,where mid-income is between $30k and $75k and high-income is above $75k 0: No, 1: Yesݖ௜୘୓ଡ଼୍େେ୊୐ Dummy indicating whether the subject believes only
CFLs contain toxic materials
0: No, 1: Yesݖ௜୘୓ଡ଼୍େ୆୓୘ୌ Dummy indicating whether the subject believes both
bulbs contain toxic materials
0: No, 1: Yesݖ௜୘୓ଡ଼୍େ,୩ Dummy indicating whether subject i’s belief of
seriousness of toxicity issue related to light bulbs is in
category k
(base = not at all serious, k = not very serious / somewhat
serious / very serious / not aware)
0: No, 1: Yes
ݖ௜୏୒୓୛୐୉ୈୋ୉ Number of correct answers among the four questions
regarding basic lighting technology
0-4ݖ௜େେ,୩ Dummy indicating whether subject i’s belief of
seriousness of climate change is in category k
(base = not at all serious, k = not very serious / somewhat
serious / very serious / not aware)
0: No, 1: Yes
ݖ௜୐୍୆୉ୖ୅୐ Dummy indicating whether the subject is politically
liberal
0: No, 1: Yes
3Table 3.Main results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
VARIABLES ߚҧ ߚҧ ߪ ߚҧ ߪ
M
ai
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at
tr
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u
te
s
CCT=3700K -0.141 (0.0796) * -0.140 (0.120) 0.678 (0.112)*** -0.147 (0.120) 0.679 (0.106)***
CCT=5000K 0.00369 (0.0774) -0.00439 (0.130) 0.771 (0.0858)*** -0.0103 (0.130) 0.805 (0.0899)***
Type=CFL 0.434 (0.0689)*** 0.571 (0.136)*** 1.110 (0.101) *** 0.227 (0.537) 1.070 (0.103)***
Watt -0.00229 (0.00117) * -0.00310 (0.00220) 0.0161 (0.00161)*** 0.00724 (0.00918) 0.0162 (0.00171)***
Brightness(x10^3 lumens) 1.373 (0.374)*** 2.200 (0.470)*** 0.619 (0.145)*** 2.190 (0.473)*** 0.654 (0.128)***
Brightness^2 -0.478 (0.159)*** -0.839 (0.200) *** 0.195 (0.0659)*** -0.836 (0.201)*** 0.188 (0.0569)***
Life(x10^3 hours) (log-normal) 0.0603 (0.00748)*** -2.655 (0.184) *** 0.916 (0.122)*** -2.845 (0.255)*** 1.070 (0.177)***
Price (log-normal) -0.151 (0.0200)*** -2.231 (0.240)*** 1.438 (0.149)*** -2.198 (0.245)*** 1.414 (0.148)***
E
ff
ec
t
o
f
p
ro
v
id
in
g
an
n
u
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o
p
er
at
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g
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st
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fo
(CCT=3700K)*Dopcost 0.138 (0.114) 0.0788 (0.169) 0.0792 (0.169)
(CCT=5000K)*Dopcost 0.128 (0.111) 0.197 (0.179) 0.233 (0.181)
Watt*Dopcost -0.00674 (0.00171)*** -0.0100 (0.00303)*** -0.0123 (0.00308)***
Life*Dopcost 0.0293 (0.0108)*** 0.0292 (0.0156)* 0.0320 (0.0151)**
Brightness*Dopcost -0.161 (0.533) -0.216 (0.656) -0.218 (0.663)
Brightness^2*Dopcost 0.0437 (0.228) 0.0856 (0.279) 0.0988 (0.281)
(Type=CFL)*Dopcost -0.148 (0.0989) -0.164 (0.187) -0.0337 (0.190)
Price*Dopcost 0.0147 (0.0284) -0.00270 (0.0366) 0.00749 (0.0377)
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
ef
fe
ct
s
o
f
co
n
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at
tr
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u
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s
Life*High-income 0.0357 (0.0196)*
Life*Mid-income 0.00139 (0.0169)
(Type=CFL)*(CC=not very
serious)
0.652 (0.543)
(Type=CFL)*(CC=somewhat
serious)
0.185 (0.444)
(Type=CFL)*(CC=very serious) 0.426 (0.418)
(Type=CFL)*(CC=not aware) -0.0639 (0.756)
Watt*(CC=not very serious) -0.00447 (0.00859)
Watt*(CC=somewhat serious) 0.000507 (0.00740)
Watt*(CC=very serious) -0.00275 (0.00711)
Watt*(CC=not aware) -0.0174 (0.0136)
(Type=CFL)*(toxicity in
CFL)*(toxic=not very dangerous)
-0.347 (0.360)
(Type=CFL)*(toxicity in CFL)*
(toxic=somewhat dangerous)
0.506 (0.332)
(Type=CFL)*(toxicity in CFL)*
(toxic=very dangerous)
-0.806 (0.480)*
(Type=CFL)*(toxicity in CFL)*
(toxic=not aware)
-0.870 (0.810)
(Type=CFL)*knowledge -0.0518 (0.0897)
Watt*Basic knowledge -0.000954 (0.00147)
(Type=CFL)*Liberal 0.370 (0.200)*
Watt*Liberal -0.00746 (0.00329)**
Observations 6,552 6,552
-1,936
6,552
-1,921Log-Likelihood -2,164
AIC/BIC 4361/4470 3920/4083 3925/4210
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4Table 4. Estimates of implicit discount rates depending on income level and the availability of
operation cost information.
Implicit discount rates
Income level
Low
(below $30k/yr)
Middle
($30k-75k/yr)
High
(over $75k/yr)
Overall
Operating cost shown 182% (38%) 57% (19%) 36% (35%) 100% (22%)
Operating cost not shown 764% (315%) 491.2% (49.2%) 203% (73%) 560% (70%)
Note: standard errors in parentheses
5Table 5. Distribution of choices of light bulbs in the compensation choice task and predicted
choices. The first two rows are for all 168 participants, the two rows in the middle are for the 83
participants who were not shown the operating cost information. The last two rows are for the 85
people who were given the cost information. Attribute values of these alternatives are shown in
Figure 2.
CFL #1 Incandescent #1 CFL #2 Total
All Subjects
Observed # of
Choices
59
(35.1%)
30
(17.9%)
79
(47.0%)
168
Predicted %
of Choices
31.1% 24.2% 44.7% 100%
Without-Cost
Group
Observed #
32
(38.6%)
20
(24.1%)
31
(37.3%)
83
Predicted % 30.4% 29.0% 40.6% 100%
With-Cost
Group
Observed #
27
(31.8%)
10
(11.8%)
48
(56.4%)
85
Predicted % 31.8% 19.6% 48.6% 100%
6Table 6. Distribution of actual choices by subjects (in the order of popularity) and of predicted choice probabilities (in
the order of size of probability) for physical sample choices.
CFL #2 CFL #1 CFL #3 Incandescent #1 Incandescent #2 Total
Observed # of
Choices
74 (44.1%) 33 (19.6%) 32 (19.0%) 23 (13.7%) 6 (3.6%) 168
Predicted %
of Choices
30% 27% 19% 15% 9% 100%
7Table 7. Estimation statistics calculated for the three types of data with Model 1. The first column
shows how well the estimated model fits with the observed data. The second column is about the
predictive performance of the model. The last column indicates how well this model behaves in a
realistic setting with additional unobserved attributes.
Estimation data Compensation task Physical choice
Model Random Model Random Model Random
Log-likelihood -1936 -2399 -173.7 -184.6 -243.1 -270.4
Equivalent average likelihood 41.2% 33.3% 35.3% 33.3% 23.5% 20.0%
Average hit rate 36.3% 33.3% 24.5% 20.0%
Avg. share prediction error 4.2% 10.4% 5.7% 9.6%
N 2184=168*13 168 168


